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The
Self in American and Japanese Cultures
Ideologies of the Self in Cross-cultural Communication
Steven L. Rosen (Copyright)
Hiroshima
Women's University, Japan
Language
and Cultural Contact · 23 · 1997
Centre for Languages and Intercultural Studies
Aalborg University
ISSN 0908-777x -
ISBN 87-7307-605-8
This paper was presented
at the 3rd Annual Symposium of the Nordic Network
for Intercultural Communication, at Aalborg University,
20-23 November 1996. |
Contents
Introduction
Every culture has concepts of personal
being, of what it means to be a 'self'. This paper argues that such
self concepts are bound to have a profound effect on cross-cultural
communication.
The ethnographic data on American culture
shows how metaphorical meanings invent a self/person as a unique
decision maker, author of its own motivations and ontologically
separable from the social world.
In Japanese culture, on the other hand,
the ethnographic data reveals concepts of personhood precipitated
out of a set of cultural meanings which feature a radical ontological
attachment of the individual to the social world, with self-control
and the suppression of (selfish) desires as the central motif of
this personhood.
This paper argues that these symbolic matrices
centering around personhood are integral to cultural communication
and can become problematic in cross-cultural communication encounters.
Theoretical
Prologue
The study of the self in social science
has, for the most part, come within the scope of role theory in
social science, particularly under the rubric of identity theory
(sociology) or personality theory (social psychology). Sociologists
and social psychologists have understood 'identity'and even 'personality'
as a composite of a person's roles and statuses. Role theory has
tried to understand personhood in terms of social rules or norms
for behavior; an individual internalizes society's rules which then
go into the formation of their identity. This internalization process
is equated with 'learning' or 'habit formation'. (Wrong 1964:113)
Social rules are believed to enter into the actor's constitution,
and are, to a large degree, self-imposed. In some schools of sociology,
human conduct is seen as totally shaped by common norms. Not only
role theory, but the sociology of knowledge in general, has tended
to adopt a normative theory of action which assumes that 'actors
know and follow rules in social situations.' (Mehan 1975:74). American
sociology in particular has taken the view that we take on the 'roles
and attitudes of significant others'. (Wurthnow et al. 1984:24).
This social science perspective, which
traces its lineage back to Durkheim, G. H. Mead, Sullivan and Dewey,
sees consciousness as largely determined by social structures. This
model has been criticized elsewhere as resulting in the 'oversocialized
conception of Man', or social determinism (Wrong; 1974:116). Of
course the more modern incarnations of Meadian social psychology
- the interpetive schools of sociology, have tried to focus more
on how actors use symbolic meanings provided by culture to construct
'life-worlds'', but they nevertheless tend to reiterate the self
vs. society dichotomy characteristic of Western social science;
society is something 'out there' with norms (which are usually derived
from the power hierachy, perhaps the priesthood or the state), impinging
on an individual 'in here' (Bachnik 1992:152). Perhaps this
is why social scientists seem to inevitably fall into the 'oversocialized
conception of Man' trap. As long as we posit an individual 'in here'
and a society 'out there' (albeit interactive) we are likely to
see the individual as determined by 'society,' seen as coercive,
implying that everyone (with the exception of sociologists, of course)
are robots parroting social roles driven by social structural forces
of which they are largely unaware.
The goal of symbolic anthropology's program,
in it's theorizing and analysis, is precisely to avoid the imposition
of western conceptual categories (like 'role' or 'status' or even
'society'). It will be more difficult if not impossible to discover
another culture's self ideologies if we have already interposed
our own western (imperialistic) conceptions. Symbolic anthropology,
with its especial emphasis on the process of symbolic invention
through metaphor/tropes, tries to steer clear of the individual
vs. society dichotomy, and all those social science categories which
are predicated on that dichotomy (e.g., conformity and deviance).
Culture itself arises out of the dialectic
between the individual and the social world - in other words it
can be said that communication is culture (and culture is communication).
Analysis is situated between convention and invention, meaning and
context; symbols are public evidence of how people are constructing
their selves, their life-worlds. Culture is the invention of meanings;
culture is communication. It's not the case that culture provides
a set of rules or norms or even core symbols which we take on board
and repeat. Rather, culture is a process of symbolic invention,
created each moment in interaction, which plays off a seamless web
of shared metaphorical meanings (Wagner 1975:35). Culture is continually
articulated through the use of symbolic elements, images, words,
gestures and so on. Symbolic elements are meaningful to us because
of their associational quality which is brought out in different
contexts (40). Communication is possible when participants share
and understand these conventional contexts and their articulation.
Put another way, culture contains core symbols or meaning sets,
centering around certain metaphors which act as structural constraints
for meaning formation, suggesting some meanings to be generated
and obviating others from occurring. Culture is thereby invented
and reinvented moment by moment through interaction by participants,
and this includes most radically an invention of a 'self '.
Every culture has a set of conventionalized
contexts which articulate a generalized conception of self or personhood
what is ordinarily called ideology or cosmology. This conventional
set of meanings, which includes most centrally a concept of what
it means to be a person, may be implicit or explicit in action,
but it is always there (Wagner 1975:40). Contrary to mainstream
sociology, moral personhood is not maintained particularly by education
or other institutions, but is continually being reinvented in communication.
Communication is a process which 'perpetuates not only the things
we learn like language and good manners, but also the regularities
of our perceptions, like color and sound, and time and space themselves'
(51). It is incumbent on an anthropology of cross-cultural communication
to try to get at this 'public symbolic order' (Harris 1989:601)
which is articulating, among other things, an experience of personhood.
This may seem like a subtle difference but it ensures that we don't
fall into the trap of imposing our own social science categories
on the subjects we study. We are not interested in arriving at a
static definition of what a putative self is rather we are
interested in seeing how others conceptualize and articulate and
thus come to actualize a sense of personhood.
The method is quite simply to look for
the recurrence of certain core tropes in the ethnographic data
to explore the web of associational meanings which spread out, lattice-like,
in interactions. An increasingly rich body of ethnographic data
on both American and Japanese culture affords us the chance to pass
from one symbolic code to another, to see which sorts of meanings
are highlighted in a culture, and which sort of meanings are obviated
by these recurring metaphors. Meanings, though generally agreed
upon by members of a culture, are obviously not totally and flawlessly
comprehended; even within a culture, key metaphors are often loosely
held together and loosely shared. This will obviously be one source
of intra-cultural mis-communication. Even more so we can see from
the semiotic point of view that cross-cultural communication is
likely to be problematic in so far as associational meanings are
rarely shared between cultures which are different. Danish and Swedish
culture may share many metaphors/meanings, but if we compare cultures
as diverse as the Pygmies of West Africa and the Yanamamo of the
Jungles of Brazil or American and Japanese culture
we can see how the lack of shared associational meanings easily
leads to cross-cultural communication problems.
The American Self
and Communication
" 'America' is a gloss for a particular patterning
or structure. It is not an object, nor is it a population."
(Varenne 1986:25)
Interpretations of American discourse show
the existence of certain recurrring metaphors which highlight a
sense of self which is highly personal, unique and seaprable from
its social matrix. The French anthropologist Herve Varenne has concluded
from his ethnography of American culture that the individual as
a self-motivating agent is a fundamental cultural category (Varenne
1984:291). We find the theme of ubiquitous choice running through
much of the analyses of American cultural discourse. Varenne finds
that Americans' self-definition extends so far as to include whether
or not to be socialized, enculturated; Americans see themselves
as 'Promethean decision makers' (14). This means that Americans
are less likely to see themselves has being determined by either
social or historical forces than, say for example, Europeans. Another
ethnography which further supports this conclusion is Carbaugh's
semiotic analysis (1988:84) of the American talk show 'Donahue'.
In the ethnographic data from talk show discourses, metaphors highlighting
the notion of the importance of personal/individual 'choice' recur
with overwhelming regularity. Not only the host, but the guest audience
members stress to the guests on the show that they always have and
have had the choice whether or not to get pregnant, have an abortion,
use contraception, stay with or leave a bad wife or husband and
etc.
To be sure, Americans do use pop sociological
terms which suggest a realization of the importance of socio-historical
forces; tropes like "role" or "identity" are
part of the American pop psychological understanding of reality
- yet these terms are understood as fundamentally nonbinding. In
other words, although Americans might believe that social and historical
forces can be part of a person's constitutional make up, they are
never radically binding; Americans believe above all else that all
humans have ubiquitous choice including the choice as to
whether to conform to traditional values or not.
As part of this program of inventing a
freely choosing individual self, it is incumbent upon Americans
to articulate themselves in ways which don't seem to be ritualized,
stereotypical or stylized (Rosenberg l970:68). The American self
is not seen as being expressed through social role but rather is
seen as being superior to any role. Americans must 'project and
experience their personality as spontaneous and unique' (Wagner
1975:82). With regard to communication praxis, this ideology manifests
itself in a speech behavior in which the participants feel it necessary
to respect others opinions, and give them the necessary opportunities
to express those opinions. It means that each individual has a certain
degree of symbolic pressure to reveal to others their personally
held opinions. Carbaugh's ethnography suggests even an urgency to
express oneself, to establish through discourse one's true feelings,
one's choice and unique interests, as part of this ideology of self-reliance
(1988:84). As we will see below, this style of self-expression,
and self invention is quite different from the Japanese conception
and expression of self.
The
Japanese Self and Communication
"I'd never been to a meeting before and didn't know
what it would be like. I imagined, however, that all the
staff would gather together and each put his own opinions
and theories forward." Botchan (Soseki 1906/1976:81)
Japanese ideology insists that the individual
create its sense of personhood through self-control and attentiveness
to the goals of the reference group. The Japanese sense of self
is rarely defined in the abstract as an American self might be (Ohnuki-Tierny
1990:93). Japanese cultural ideology puts little faith in the existence
of the individual personality Japanese 'cannot justify a
self identity as a valuable social identity distinct from culturally
expected behavior.' (Pelzel 1970:47) The symbolic invention of personhood
involves an 'intention of mutuality' in a way that American self-invention
does not. Kondo observed in her participant observation of a Japanese
workplace, that she was never allowed to act in ways which would
suggest that she was an autonomous and free individual (Kondo 1985:26).
It seems that in Japanese culture, there is not the same overriding
pressure, as there is for Americans, to invent oneself as a free
agent, 'one's own man'.
In contrast to American personhood, which
is under symbolic pressure not only to be true to one's self but
also to publicly express this 'true self', the Japanese sense of
self is actualized through self-control. The mark or sign of a truly
mature person in Japan is the ability to put aside one's own selfish
desires in favor of those of whatever group they find themselves
a member of. This orientation is even more marked among women, who
must, above all else, be able to accommodate themselves to the needs
of others (Kondo 33).
Though Americans view efforts to repress
aspects of one's unique selfhood in favor of group demands as oppressive
(an American woman once told me that I must be damaging my self
psychologically by being able to fit in at Japanese staff meetings),
self-control is viewed in Japanese culture, not as a dangerous act
of self-castration, but as the mark of a 'healthy personality'
(to use an American phrase). Self-control is a sign of kokoro or
'heart'. I have argued elsewhere that Japanese personhood is is
centered around the key trope of kokoro (glossed as 'heart'), and
that this ideal is actualized through self-control of selfish desires
(Rosen 1990). Standing in binary opposition to this is the metaphor
wagamama (glossed as 'selfishness'), seen as a moral evil in Japanese
cultural ideology. Japanese selfhood, therefore, is invented along
the lines of a symbolic oppositon between selfishness (a moral wrong)
and pure heart achieved through self-control (a moral good).
Not only my own ethnographic data but that
of others reaffirms this conclusion. In the so-called spiritual
education seminars in Japan held by companies and religious groups
alike, individuals are taught to improve themselves through the
exercise of self-restraint (enryo) and the ability to endure hardship
(gaman); the self-improvement which results from this type of self
control in the face of both physical and mental hardships is precisely
what leads to the actualization of 'heart'/kokoro. In other
words, the Japanese self is symbolically constructed in contexts
which emphasize self-control as a means to and expression of heart.
Personhood then becomes defined as involving the obviation of personal
interests in favor of corporate/social ones.
Part of this process of self-control in
social situations requires the perfection of the social mask or
persona (tatemae). Persona is not the moral evil it is in American
culture, not the mark of inauthenticity, but the mark of maturity
it signifies the desire if not the ability to harmonize with
the group. My own experience supervising English teachers working
at a college in Japan was that westerners often can't understand
(what they perceive to be) an overemphasis on form over content
in Japanese interaction, in informal as well as formal settings.
These westerners tended to denigrate communication which they perceived
as being purely ritualized, viewing it as phony and disingenuous,
not to mention shallow. But in Japan, it is precisely this ability
to skillfully use set phrases and stylized discourse markers which
signifies that an individual is a mature self (Kondo 26). So, unlike
American selfhood, which demands a person to publicaly show their
'true self', in Japan the development of a ritualized social persona
is a necessary condition for Japanese selfhood.
In 1990, when I escorted a group of around
50 students to Cambridge, England for summer English language study,
there were continual cross-cultural communication problems which
were never resolved. In a nutshell, the British teachers were constantly
frustrated by the lack of straightforward answers to direct questions,
or frustrated that their questions to the Japanese students were
sometimes met by silence, or simple one-word answers. The teachers
were frustrated that Japanese students preferred not to reveal personal
opinions or give straight-forward replies to direct questions. The
Japanese students, for their part, often complained that the teachers
couldn't understand what they were trying to communicate!
Smith has observed that, in the interests
of group harmony (wa), Japanese will often refrain from putting
their own opinions forward (Smith 1983:57). This writer's 'ethnographic
experience' living in Japan and working for a Japanese college,
has confirmed what most ethnographies have said about this phenomenon:
that Japanese are reluctant to express themselves directly, categorically
and unequivocally, preferring instead the use of indirection and
paralinguistic strategies which would not have them committed to
one black and white irrevocable position. The term inshindenshin
means a kind of quasi-telepathic communication style characteristic
of in-group communication; members know each other so well it becomes
less necessary to resort to direct verbal expressions, and this
helps maintain group harmony. Since Americans don't participate
in such symbolic praxis, this will be an obvious source of cross-cultural
communication difficulties.
In Cambridge, the Japanese students failed
to realize that the westerners could not value or appreciate communication
in which meanings were not directly packaged in words, where individuals
didn't try to communicate themselves as unique individuals and unique
opinion holders. The existence of a pronounced inside-outide distinction
(ura-omote) (not particularly salient in America) also will affect
communication; true feelings (honne) are expressed to in-group members
while for 'outside' people, interaction is characterized by more
mask/ persona (tatemae). Metaphors relating to hierarchy are also
relevant here in that communicative reserve will be more pronounced
with social superiors. The interested reader is referred to the
wealth of literature on Japanese hierarchy and social structure
(Nakane 1967; Lebra 1976).
However, what the ethnographic data points
too is not just a 'group orientation' for Japanese people (in any
culture one can find those who are 'other- directed' and those who
make a point of going their own way) it shows that Japanese
are enculturated such that their self definition is generated from
a radical ontological attachment to the group. Augustine Barque,
in his study of Japanese personhood and cosmology (1993:93-104)
argues that Japanese metaphors show a logic of identification rather
than identity, 'in which sharing a common attribute entails an intersubjective
shift' (101). Whereas the Euro-American tradition stresses a logic
of identity with self as clearly distinguished from others (and
from nature), the Japanese tradition has stressed the logic of a
self in terms of what it is not; if one is, for example, a middle-aged
housewife married to a company man, then one can not easily assume
the 'role' of 'artist' (102). Berque maintains that Japanese metaphors
organize reality into certain sets (Kata) which transcend the individual
subject such that the individual is related all the more to their
physical and social environment.
This is presumably what social scientists
have meant when they say that Japanese have little role flexibility,
or more rigid role categories (Lebra 1976:362). This is why a Japanese
working for Mitsubishi, for example, would be more likely to reveal
themselves as 'a Mitsubishi man' than just 'a company man'. 'In
that sense, the Japanese self is relatively permeable with its environment
(both social and psychical); but only as much as this environment
has been institutionalized (codified) into what reality is for the
Japanese.' (Berque 103) The revelance of this for cross-cultural
communication encounters is that Japanese may be trying to establish
a link for themselves to contexts which transcend themselves. The
American, on the other hand, may be trying to reiterate a sense
of self as separate and distinct from both the other and the communicative
context, and may feel uncomfortable with efforts to establish a
(radical) empathic link with the other in communication praxis.
Conclusion
In Japanese culture, key tropes, core symbols,
center around a sense of personhood as actualized in social contexts.
American cultural metaphors articulate a definition of personhood
as something actualized by freedom of choice which is the expression
of a self-reliant self, a unique personality invented precisely
as a result of personal 'choices'. Americans are under a pressure
to try to communicate themselves as unique human beings not falsified
by social norms. The moral urgency to 'express oneself' directly
and clearly in public, is not part of Japanese cultural ideology.
The American understanding of and emphasis
on 'self-reliance' in the invention of personhood, is foreign to
Japanese culture. In Japanese cultural ideology, going against the
group or 'going my way' as the Japanese put it (borrowing a western
phrase), is a sign of selfishness. Japanese metaphors articulate
an ideology of self in which personhood is actualized in social
contexts which transcend a putative 'individual.' In the on-going
process of cultural invention which is communication, Japanese will
be trying to articulate this conception of self which is radically
different from American self-definitions. If, in cross-cultural
communication encounters between Americans and Japanese, the participants
are unawares of their cultural ideologies of personhood which structure
their perceptions and experience of reality (not to mention their
communicative styles), then there's likely to be a great deal of
mis-communication.
While this paper has outlined some of the
theoretical issues at stake, it still remains to analyze specific
communication encounters between Americans and Japanese to see how
these culturally specific definitions of self tend to obviate meaningful
communication. The failure to look at the symbolic matrices which
radically structure, among other things, an experience of the self
will be to condemn oneself to intercultural communication which
is superficial at best.
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